JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Along with the higher quantity of new building, construction in this decade was characterized by higher costs. Actually, the cost issue concerns two different dimensions. The first has to do with the fact that it cost more to build the same kind of structure than it had earlier in the century, given that materials and labor were becoming more expensive. The wholesale price of wood, for example, increased almost fivefold between I900 and I920, due to the exhaustion of the great timber stands of the upper Midwest and the expense of transporting lumber from the South and Pacific Northwest (Doucet and Weaver 1985: 56I). The field of
house building, dominated by small contractors with little capital and equipment, experienced no technological breakthroughs similar to those in the mass production industries to offset these cost pressures. As a result, at the same time that many goods were getting cheaper, the cost of construction was rising (Monthly Labor The second cost dimension, on which this article focuses, has to do with the tendency for housing newly built in the 1920S to be increasingly aimed at the high end of the market.2 This was a pattern throughout the country, and it became more extreme as the decade progressed. Despite high production levels and negligible inflation in the overall economy in the twenties, builders spent an average of 21% more on each housing unit in I929 than they had in 1922 (Grebler et Despite the total increase in new building over the two prewar decades, not all housing types saw an upswing in production. Builders in the I920S shied away from the smaller types of rental properties. As can be seen from Table I , all varieties of small multi-unit buildings, including two-flats, three-flats, four-family two-deckers, and little apartment houses (with 5 to Io units), became smaller parts of the construction mix.
This change was most dramatic with regard to the two-flat, the traditional mainstay of Chicago's moderate rental market. The term two-flat, in Chicago usage, refers not to a specific kind of structure but to any building consisting of two vertically stacked units. The two-flat ranged from small one-and-a-half-story frame houses with apartments in their high basements to elaborate, limestone-faced two-story brick buildings with expensive interior finishings. A very standard type, however, was a wood frame structure with two full stories (see While construction trends in suburban communities near Chicago were obviously related to developments in the city itself, they cannot be assumed to have been identical. Unfortunately, for the period under consideration, only fragmentary information exists on building activities outside the city limits. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics collected data on construction patterns, based on building permits, for three suburbs, but only for 1921 on (1920 in one case). In Evanston and Oak Park, two-flats were an insignifi- 
CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION OF NEW HOUSING
In general, the increase in the larger apartment buildings and in single-family housing, combined with the decrease in the small rental properties, meant that housing production was focused more at the high end of the market than previously. This was true because most of the biggest buildings were tall elevator apartment houses built along the spectacular and expensive shoreline of Lake Michigan. By 1928, tall buildings collectively containing over 700 apartments lined the desirable beachfront, nicknamed the "Gold Coast," directly north of the Loop, and most of these had been constructed in the boom of the twenties.6 (A section of Since the city required steel and concrete fireproof construction when apartment houses went over three stories, the tall buildings were always aimed at the highest-paying clientele. Thus, for the most part the biggest buildings were built at a deluxe standard. However, not all new rental properties featured the doormen, swimming pools, and expensive views of the lakeshore buildings. Thousands of new apartments throughout the city were in three-story buildings without elevators. While a few of these walk-ups had as many as 42 dwellings, typically they were much smaller. All of the multi-unit buildings from io to I9 units, a category that showed substantial gains in construction, were of this type ( Along with the medium-sized rental buildings, the other kind of structure that showed a substantial production increase in the 1920S was the one-family dwelling. Almost all urban houses for single families were built for sale (Colean 1944: 231) . Therefore, the trend toward increased construction of these buildings represented a shift to providing shelter for the relatively affluent, since homeowners tended to be better off than renters. Nationally, the median income of homeowning families in I929 was one-third higher than that of tenant families, according to data collected by the National Bureau of Economic Research (Wickens 194I: 146) . In Chicago, the situation appears to have been slightly more skewed. Thus, construction of more single houses as well as medium-sized and large apartment buildings manifested responsiveness to the upscale segment of the housing market.7
In contrast to the types of properties that builders were favoring after the war, two-flats and other small buildings were typically less expensive for renters. One reason is that owners who lived in the same building or nearby weighed raising rents against losing good tenants who were also their neighbors. In addition, such owners routinely did their own maintenance, counting it not as an additional expense on which income should be calculated but simply as part of the routine of caring for their own residence. Finally, the kinds of people who put their money in small rental buildings were not likely to consider rates of return available in other kinds of investments when deciding how much to charge their tenants. In other words, living in smaller buildings often cost less, not because these kinds of residences were inherently cheaper to build or maintain (although smaller buildings were often constructed to a more modest standard) but because they were not managed according to the same profit calculations as the larger, more professionally run properties. Whatever the reasons, however, the outcome for tenants was that small buildings were more affordable. Thus, the decline in their supply in the I920S represented a shift toward urban shelter that cost housing consumers more.
CRITIQUE OF CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR CHANGING BUILDING PATTERNS
Some observers in the twenties noticed that commercial builders were constructing a different mix of housing types, and the new production patterns were noted by some analysts later. At the close of the decade, Coleman Woodbury investigated why apartments had increased so dramatically since the war as a proportion of new residential building, citing Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys that showed that apartments had increased from 24% of new housing units in I92I to 54% in 1928 in 255 cities throughout the country. Handicapped by a lack of reliable data on such topics as vacancy rates and building costs, Woodbury's studies were inconclusive. However, the results of a questionnaire completed by 1,882 families from a variety of income groups living in Chicago and surrounding towns indicated that the great bulk of urban dwellers still desired to buy their own single-family home. If consumer preferences had not shifted, Woodbury reasoned, then the source of the changes must have been related to "certain economic conditions within the various industries and businesses which produce houses." He suggested that one such factor might have been the "remarkable flow of capital" provided by real estate bonds (Woodbury 1931 : 6, 3 ).
For the most part, however, commentators have not treated the shifts in building patterns as a problematic issue, assuming it to be self-evident that decisions of investors and contractors were primarily determined by public policy and consumer demand. The first of these two factors relates to the effects of building codes adopted during the Progressive Era. As Anthony Jackson (1976: 157) puts this argument in his history of low-cost housing in Manhattan, "The grade of dwelling that private enterprise had supplied for the use of nineteenth-century immigrants had been rejected by the rising standards of housing reform, which had served the community rather than the poor by preventing private enterprise from reaching down to this level." In other words, the new municipal codes requiring certain minimum levels of plumbing, room size, and so forth increased the cost of minimal shelter such that there was no longer a sufficient profit incentive to attract entrepreneurs to this field.
The other factor presumed to be of significance in explaining the behavior of builders in this period is consumer preference. In a characteristic expression of this perspective, Carroll Binder (1931) argued in the Chicago Daily News that "so much demand has been created for electric iceboxes, automatic garbage chutes, parquet flooring and deluxe bathrooms that prospective apartment house builders hesitate to construct anything which does not incorporate all those desirable features. They fear that tenants will spurn apartments lacking such conveniences." Thus, because of what Binder saw as an unrealistic desire for luxuries on the part of low-paid Chicagoans, the outcome for construction activity at the bottom of the market was "stagnation." In I942, M. H. Naigles (1942: 874), a researcher for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, employed a similar analysis to explain the decline of the two-family house nationally. The one-family house had come to be more popular by the 1920s, Naigles explained, as demonstrated by the increase in the number constructed throughout the country. With somewhat circular logic he argued that, since the single-family house had become more popular, and since its chief distinguishing characteristic was its single entrance, it naturally followed that houses with two entrances had become less popular. From these premises he concluded that "the growing demand for separate rather than common entrances contributed to the decline in the number of newly constructed two-family houses." Like Binder, Naigles was certain that if particular shelter types were not being produced, it proved that people did not want to live in them.
No doubt each of these ways of explaining the shift to more expensive housing has some validity. Obviously, the new building codes of the early twentieth century increased the cost of providing the most modest sorts of urban living accommodations. It was probably also the case that a good many Americans did long 37) credits the success of the three-decker to the fact that "it was, after all, a poor man's house, a poor man's investment, and a poor man's bargain."
Despite its popularity in the first part of the century, the threedecker declined in relation to other kinds of residential structures after World War I. Rodwin explains that, although Boston's I924 zoning law is usually credited for this change, the fall in production actually began in 1917, when apartments in three-unit buildings accounted for 25% of the total residential units built that year, compared to 38% the year before. By I92I, the proportion of dwelling units in these buildings was only 15%, a level maintained throughout the decade (ibid.: 38, 60). Like the Chicago twoflat, the Boston three-decker was another modest urban dwelling type that experienced a sharp production decline in the I920S not explicable on the basis of conventional analysis.
It should be noted, however, that while consumer demand does not provide a good explanation for the falloff in building at the low end of the market, there is one sense in which the desires of the buying public may be a viable explanation for changes in building patterns. Keeping in mind that the relevant unit for demand is not the individual or the family but the dollar, it becomes clear that the housing needs of affluent people will receive more attention from builders than the needs of a similar number of less affluent people. The decade of the twenties was a time of rising inequality, with the richest 5% increasing their share of disposable income from 29% in I922 to 35% just seven years later. This change in income distribution was probably one force propelling builders toward constructing more expensive dwellings (Soule 1947: 317).
THE IMPACT OF CHANGING INVESTMENT PATTERNS
Despite the probable impact of wealth becoming more concentrated at the top, changing investment patterns may have been even more significant in transforming the overall pattern of housing production in the I920s. In this decade two economic shifts with important implications for housing finance occurred. First, banking institutions were moving away from commercial loans and into real estate investment. Second, a large number of middle-class individuals around the country began putting their savings into national financial markets rather than into local rental housing, the traditional vehicle for small investors. One result was that, as a proportion of the value of urban real estate, mortgage debt grew from I3.9% in 192I to 37.5% in 1929 (Pederson 1933: 66) . Overall, the proportion of gross capital formation devoted to residential construction averaged essentially the same as during the two decades before the war; the significant change was in the source of the invested funds (Grebler et al. 1956 : 428-30). As Michael Stone (I980: 83) points out, this strong trend toward debt, rather than equity financing, marked the I920S as the beginning of the period in which the U.S. housing sector was inextricably linked to credit, especially from institutional lenders. The new financial climate made it easier for entrepreneurs to assemble funds for building ventures, and the most popular projects were those with the highest profit margins, such as large luxury rental buildings or houses constructed for sale.8
The reason that institutional lending in real estate was increasing in this decade had to do with the fact that in the I920S corporations were turning away from banks as sources of funds for expansion, relying instead on their own profits or using stock and bond issues to generate capital (Fearon 1987 Before the introduction of this form of security, promoters were limited to raising capital for large construction projects by means of short-term, and often expensive, credit arrangements. Only after a building was finished could they secure longer-term loans on better terms in the form of a mortgage from a large institutional lender, such as an insurance company or a savings bank. These mortgages, however, were conventionally limited to about half of a building's net worth. Then, around the turn of the century, brokers who had been in the business of bringing builders and lenders together invented a new financing method. This was the real estate mortgage bond, by which individuals could purchase shares of a whole mortgage or groups of whole mortgages. With these securities, not only was more money available to builders, but it was available up front, as bond issues were typically floated before construction began (Smith 1938 Homer Hoyt, in his classic history of Chicago real estate, describes how in 1927, despite increasing vacancies and a plateauing of rents, new luxury apartments were still being started. He explains that, because so many people were still buying mortgage bonds, "in many cases it was possible for a promoter to borrow enough money on a bond issue to buy a lot, erect a twelve-story building, and pay himself a cash profit besides." Such a profit, Hoyt emphasizes, was in addition to the return reaped when an apartment building was sold. According to another commentator, the public appetite for real estate bonds was so voracious in the speculative frenzy of the late I920S that, "instead of property owners seeking an investment house to finance an apartment build-ing, the bond houses were seeking the property owner, showing him how a building could be financed without any capital on his part." With none of their own money on the line and an immediate profit to be had, it is easy to see why entrepreneurs were still initiating projects in the late I920s The continuing popularity of mortgage bonds with investors in the face of slumping demand for new housing resulted in part from the fact that many customers were inexperienced and had no source of information on the market for the properties they were financing other than the bond houses. These institutions were, of course, inclined to cheerful predictions, since they made money on each new issue whether or not the property ultimately produced the income predicted for it. Real estate bond investors were especially vulnerable because there was no real supervision of this market by any government agency. State laws limiting mortgage loans to a certain percentage of appraised property value were one of the few ways this kind of activity was regulated. Such laws proved an inadequate safeguard, however, since the appraisers were usually employees of the companies that sold the bonds (Jones 1933: 359) .
By the end of the decade the mortgage bond business had begun to unravel. Bonds were defaulting in large numbers, new customers stopped coming forward, and bond houses collapsed. At the same time that bond-driven construction was leading to overbuilding of high-end properties, the new investment opportunities of the period, including real estate bonds, were draining capital away from the modest rental sector. Traditionally, local investors seeking a safe place for their savings had financed most urban residential property, the bulk of which consisted of small rental buildings. In the twenties small investors changed their behavior and began entering the national financial markets in large numbers. Economists generally credit the government-sponsored Liberty and Victory Loan bond drives of the war years with familiarizing small investors with these kinds of opportunities. Thereafter, many people found buying the newly available low- 
CONCLUSION
Real estate mortgage bonds were a new technique for large-scale real estate financing that encouraged high-end construction while simultaneously creating new investment opportunities that seem to have diverted money from small real estate ventures. These securities assembled large amounts of capital that tended to be used for investments promising the best returns, dwellings to be rented or sold at the high end of the market, such as luxury apartments, which showed such a phenomenal increase in production. As always, buildings such as the modest Chicago two-flat, which yielded lower profit margins, were avoided by sophisticated investors. What was new in this period was, first, that more money was available for large, high-profit projects, and second, that there was less for small ventures, an overall pattern that directly corresponds to the changes in Chicago residential construction examined at the outset of this discussion.
More generally, the coincidence of these changes with transformations in investment practices suggests that we should give more attention to the financial aspects of U.S. urban housing and to the ways in which real estate investment has been connected to trends in the larger economy. As a result, we may better understand how the housing market worked before the federal government became deeply involved in its operations during the 1930s. In addition, paying more attention to the political economy of housing may aid in the endeavor of understanding "the interaction between large social processes and the changing form of cities" (Tilly I984: 123). 
